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WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION CIVIL SUPPORT
TEAMS (WMD-CST): A NECESSARY FAILURE

by

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Abstract

If you believe weapons of mass destruction (WMD), chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high-yield explosives (CBRNE), exist and pose a threat to this country and our way of life, this paper will alternately elicit both fear and assurance. The reality of the threat will elicit a fear for yourself, your family and your country, while the recognition of this threat by the national security community and the creation of response units like the Army National Guard's (ARNG) Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST) might give you assurance you are safe. Unfortunately, poor program management, ineffective equipment acquisition and unclear command and control structures have made the current version of the WMD-CST teams ineffective and inspire fear because our nation is at risk.

This paper investigates the threat that drove the creation and evolution of the WMD-CST program. It then explores the specific mission of the WMD-CSTs to assess, advise and facilitate a response to a WMD event in the United States. This mission, and the ARNG's unique federal-state status, is critical to coordinating a synergistic state/local and federal response during and after a WMD event. The paper then focuses on the current program management and organizational problems affecting these teams. The paper concludes by offering suggestions on programmatic, doctrinal and organizational solutions to make these teams an effective part of a coordinated Homeland Security (HLS) response force. For without these teams to bridge the chasm between state/local and federal response units to a WMD event, the nation's reaction will be inefficient and lives will be lost.

Chapter 1

The Threat

I, William, J. Clinton, President of the United States of America, find that the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and of the means of delivering such weapons, constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat.

—Executive Order 12938

The threat is real. This simple statement sends chills through your body and a fear for yourself and your family. It may seem inconceivable that the lone superpower in the world possessing unrivaled military might and unparalleled economic power is susceptible. Ironically, it is this very power which makes us vulnerable to asymmetric attacks involving terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The *National Security Strategy for a New Century* confirms “because of our dominance in the conventional military arena, adversaries who challenge the United States are likely to do so using asymmetric means, such as WMD, information operations or terrorism.”¹ In fact, former President Clinton has predicted there is a 100 percent chance of a biological or chemical terrorist attack in the US over the next 10 years.²

Terrorism is a constant threat and comes in many forms: individual, domestic, foreign and state-sponsored (fig. 1). Unfortunately for society, terrorists in today’s informational wonderland have an incredible ability to collect information, raise money, disseminate rhetoric

and attract supporters. In addition, they have near instant access to advanced information on technology and the ability to communicate this data widely and efficiently. This freedom, coupled with the materials and technology to use them, makes the world an increasingly vulnerable place to live.




Figure 1 Examples of Recent Terrorists Acts

The materials and technology to create and detonate a WMD device are available from many sources. Terrorists can acquire them under the guise of legitimate commercial purposes. Alternatively, the disintegration of many Eastern Bloc nations has raised concern about their ability to protect and control WMD materials and technology. This haphazard accountability coupled with the potential unemployment of thousands of skilled scientists willing to sell their services to ample and available buyers pose a grave threat to our nation. “All of the seven states that sponsor terrorism have some Biological Weapons (BW) or Chemical Weapons (CW) [sic] program and 23 countries have BW or CW weapons.”³ Surprisingly, a terrorist may have to look no further than the US to acquire materials. “New reports circulating in the Pentagon and available on Capitol Hill warn of ‘lax security’ for the special nuclear materials under the protection of the Department (of Energy). One such report, referenced in a letter addressed to

new Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham, concludes lax security means that terrorists have a ready supply of Special Nuclear Materials already existing and available within our borders.”⁴ Finally, we must recognize the manufacturing and delivery methodologies for a vast majority of WMD devices can be accomplished with relative ease. According to Gen Tommie R. Franks, Commander in Chief, US Central Command, the “low-cost and dual-use of WMD” makes them extremely attractive to terrorists and there likely course of action.⁵

With these facts confronting us, it is logical to assume terrorists will strike. They may use WMD against civilians in our cities similar to the sarin attacks in the Tokyo subways in 1995 and the attempted sarin attack in London in February of 2001. They may attempt to exploit our vulnerabilities and impede the continuity of government operations exemplified when Timothy McVeigh detonated a five-thousand-pound truck bomb in Oklahoma City in 1995 killing 168 people and destroying the Murrah Federal Building. But the most chilling examples are the exercises our government runs to check our response capability to a WMD event. A recent exercise known as Alamo Alert simulated a biological attack in San Antonio, Texas. According to Lieutenant General Carlton, US Air Force Surgeon General, “we killed the entire country.”⁶ This lack of response capability coupled with a “blue-ribbon US commission report that an attack using nuclear, chemical or biological agents is likely in the United States in the next 25 years” is spurring the US government to respond.⁷

Notes

¹ *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, December 1999), 19.

² Richard Clarke, National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-terrorism, interviewed on 60 Minutes, 22 October 2000.

Notes

³ Center for Strategic and International Studies, "Proceedings of the April 5th Senior Advisory Group Meeting, Homeland Defense," 5 April 2000, n.p., on-line, Internet, 3 March 2001, available from <http://www.csis.org/homeland/reports/sag040500.html>.

⁴ Notra Trulock, "Nuclear and Biological Warfare -- Easier Said than Done," *CNS Commentary from the Free Congress Foundation*, 20 February 2001, n.p., on-line, Internet, 27 February 2001, available from <http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewCommentary.asp?Page=\Commentary\archive\200102\COM20010220e.html>.

⁵ Gen Tommie R. Franks, USCENTCOM CINC, lecture, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 15 March 2001.

⁶ Lt Gen Paul K. Carlton, Jr., USAF Surgeon General, lecture, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 6 February 2001.

⁷ John Donnelly, "Bioterrorism Threat Finds New Urgency," *Boston Globe*, 3 February 2001, n.p., on-line, Internet, 7 February 2001, available from http://www.boston.com/dailyglobe2/034/nation/Bioterrorism_threat_finds_new_urgency+.shtml.

Chapter 2

The Response

I believe the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction presents the greatest threat that the world has ever known. We are finding more and more countries who are acquiring technology – not only missile technology – and are developing chemical weapons and biological weapons capabilities to be used in theater and also on a long range basis. So I think that is perhaps the greatest threat that any of us will face in the coming years.

—Secretary of Defense William Cohen
January 1997

President Clinton Gets a Rude Welcome

The bombing of New York's World Trade Center in 1993 occurred just two weeks into the life of the Clinton administration and forced the new president to focus early on the terrorist issue. The administration took numerous actions to respond to this threat (fig. 2).


- 
- 1993 - World Trade Center and CIA HQ Attacks
 - 1995 - PDD 39 issued
 - 1996 - Nunn-Lugar Domenici Act (PL 104-201)
 - 1998 - PDD 62
 - 1998 - Tiger Team Report
 - 1998 - President Clinton's Speech at USNA
 - 1999 - UCP 99
 - 1999 - 1st 10 Teams Authorized
 - 2000 - Next 17 Teams Authorized
 - 2001 - Next 5 Teams Authorized

Figure 2 Clinton Administration Action

Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39), dated June 21, 1995, entitled “U.S. Policy on Counter-terrorism” states “the United States shall give the highest priority to developing effective capabilities to detect, prevent, defeat and manage the consequences of nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) materials or weapons used by terrorists.” It further mandated the creation of Emergency Support Teams (EST) and placed the Department of Justice (DOJ) with its designated agent the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in charge of crisis management and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in charge of consequence management (fig. 3).




Figure 3 Crisis v. Consequence Management

This directive created only a peripheral role for the Department of Defense (DOD) in domestic events, only stipulating DOD would provide transportation domestically for the ESTs and provide assistance to foreign citizens

DOD Gets a Bigger Role

The Department of Defense's involvement evolved in 1996 with the passing of Public Law 104-201, also known as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act or the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act. This Law had several important findings:

"... the capability of potentially hostile nations and terrorist groups to acquire nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons is greater than at any time in history;"

"There is a significant and growing threat of attack of weapons of mass destruction on targets that are not military targets in the usual sense;"

"... the threat posed to the citizens of the United States by nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons delivered by unconventional means is significant and growing;"

"The United States lacks adequate planning and countermeasures to address the threat of nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical terrorism."¹

This law significantly increased the role of DOD in domestic activity by making it the lead agency responsible for training first responders to a WMD event. Based on this tasking, DOD created the Domestic Preparedness Program (DPP) that to date has trained over 22,500 personnel in 91 cities.

This law was followed in May of 1998 by Presidential Decision Directive 62 (PDD-62) that reaffirmed PDD-39 and created a new structure at the federal strategic level to deal with a WMD event. PDD-62 directed "an integrated program to increase our effectiveness in countering these threats and to prepare to manage the consequences of attacks against U.S. [sic] citizens or infrastructure." President Clinton further expounded on this topic in a commencement address at the US Naval Academy announcing "that our nation would do more to protect its citizens against the growing threat of chemical and biological terrorism. As part of this effort, he said, the Department of Defense would form 10 teams to support state and local authorities in the event of

an incident involving weapons of mass destruction.”² This statement was a direct outgrowth of the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed 1998 Army Tiger Team report that focused on the most likely tasks DOD would perform as the Federal Response Plan is implemented in support of a WMD event. This report recommended the creation of Army National Guard (ARNG) teams to support the response to WMD events at the tactical level. The final linking mechanism was put in place by the 1999 Unified Command Plan (UCP) that created the Joint Task Force for Civil Support (JTF-CS) under Joint Forces Command to address the operational level.

The WMD-CST Concept Evolves

The Consequence Management Program Integration Office (CoMPIO) was created in 1998 under the Director of Military Support, the Army’s agent in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for planning and executing the DOD support mission to civilian authorities within the US. COMPIO’s responsibilities included budgeting, contracting, and quality assurance actions; evaluating current capabilities of WMD response elements; integrating WMD training activities; coordinating development of WMD consequence management doctrine and modifications; coordinating development and production of doctrinal publications; and coordinating development of scenarios and integrating WMD exercise activities among local, state, and federal response elements.³ To support the execution of these responsibilities, CoMPIO formed ARNG teams, who would operate under either Title 32 or Title 10, intended to assist emergency first responders.

Why the Guard?

“In both the *1997 National Security Strategy* and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report, the President and the Secretary of Defense introduced an integrated strategic approach

embodied by the terms **Shape, Respond and Prepare Now.**”⁴ The proposed WMD-CST teams would support this strategic approach in the following ways:

- Shape: Educate and train local and state teams;
- Respond: Assess the situation, advise and facilitate response;
- Prepare Now for an Uncertain Future: Participate in exercises and provide on-call response teams.

The Department of Defense, with its vast weapons handling and detection capabilities, robust command and control system, and vast experience involving chemical, biological and nuclear weapons was the logical selection to man these teams. Within DOD, the selection of the Army to oversee and staff these teams was a natural choice since their mission essential task list (METL) includes support of civil authorities, officially known as Military Support to Civilian Authorities (MSCA), and mobilization of the Army. In addition, the Army was the only branch within DOD with already developed formalized doctrine for WMD incident response and domestic preparedness. However, one must remember, DOD is trained, organized and equipped to provide a military response against potential threats against US interests abroad. “Furthermore, even if available for domestic use, these...response units would be available only as part of the *federal* response effort initiated by the president after state and local resources become overwhelmed.”⁵ Therefore, it was critical to develop a capability to bridge the federal-state gap.

The ARNG was the perfect choice due to its unique federal-state relationship. According to former New Jersey Governor Christine Todd Whitman, “the Guard is the first line for the states in responding to emergencies” and is critical for managing the aftermath of any WMD event.⁶ Therefore, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team (WMD-CST) mission

represented a natural extension of the Guard's traditional state role and was a perfect fit for a mission that would require them to "support civil authorities and *not* take charge of a situation."⁷ In addition, putting a National Guardsman in charge was a way of building a bridge to the civilian community since many Guardsman either are or work closely with local and state first responders. However, it is clear, these "teams are not intended to replace any existing state and local assets, but to add a key element missing from most jurisdictions—a coordinating authority that can facilitate communication between authorities at the scene and officials elsewhere, provide on-site technical expertise, and facilitate follow-on support from state and federal agencies, including the military."⁸


Mission of the WMD-CSTs

The mission of a WMD-CST is to deploy to an area of operations to:

- ***ASSESS*** a suspected Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear or High-yield Explosive (CBRNE) event in *support* of a local incident commander;
- ***ADVISE*** civilian responders regarding appropriate action, and;
- ***FACILITATE*** requests for assistance to expedite arrival of additional state and federal assets to help save lives, prevent human suffering and mitigate great property damage.⁹

The baseline tasks the team will fulfill to support this broad task are contained in figure 4.¹⁰ Therefore, what the teams bring to the fight, in addition to specialized skills and equipment, is an understanding of DOD response capabilities that will augment local and state assets and a reachback capability to access distant expertise and reduce on-scene footprint. In addition, due to their unique federal-state status, they will likely be the first DOD asset on-scene and able to bridge the gap until other federal assets are requested and arrive.

The WMD-CSTs, like the rest of the ARNG is first and foremost a state asset and operationally falls under the control of the adjutant general of the state. As a result, they are available to respond to an incident as part of a state response, well before federal response assets would be called upon to provide assistance. Then, if the situation were to evolve into an event that overwhelmed state and local response assets, the governor could request the president to issue a declaration of national disaster and the teams could facilitate the federal response. At that point, the team would continue to support local officials in their state status or transition to federal status, either way providing assistance in channeling additional military and other federal assets in support of the local incident commander.¹¹ Therefore, it is clear, the WMD-CSTs provide the critical glue to meld the federal and state responses and that this mission is best accomplished by the ARNG.



Baseline WMD Mission and Capabilities

- **Upon request of civil authorities:**
 - Technical Advice
 - On-site situational assessments, and
 - Detection Capability for Federal, State, and local response elements and agencies in the event of a WMD incident
 - Provide early detection, initial sample collection, and NBC reconnaissance
 - Provide initial medical assessment
 - Assist in NBC hazard predictions and assessments, including:
 - Identification of boundaries of the affected area
 - Distribution of hazard
 - Type of hazard agent
 - Severity of damages, deaths, and injuries

Figure 4 Baseline WMD-CST Tasks

Notes

¹ “DoD Tiger Team Report, Department of Defense Plan for Integrating National Guard and Reserve Component Support for Response to Attacks Using Weapons of Mass Destruction,” January 1998, n.p., on-line, Internet, 5 March 2001, available from http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/wmdresponse/chapter_1.html.

² Charles L. Cragin, “Defense Leaders Commentary: The Facts on WMD Civil Support Teams,” 6 April 2000, n.p., on-line, Internet, 3 March 2001, available from http://www.infowar.com/wmd/00/wmd_040600a_j.shtml.

³ “DoD Tiger Team Report, Department of Defense Plan for Integrating National Guard and Reserve Component Support for Response to Attacks Using Weapons of Mass Destruction.”

⁴ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy*, 1997, n.p., on-line, Internet, 19 February 2001, available from <http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/nms/executiv.htm>.

⁵ Charles L. Cragin.

⁶ Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Proceedings of the April 5th Senior Advisory Group Meeting, Homeland Defense,” 5 April 2000, n.p., on-line, Internet, 3 March 2001, available from <http://www.csis.org/homeland/reports/sag040500.html>.

⁷ Katherine McIntire Peters, “Defending U.S.,” *Government Executive Magazine*, 1 June 2000, n.p., on-line, Internet, 3 March 2001, available from <http://www.govexec.com/features/0600/0600s2.htm>.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ 72nd CST Home Page, n.p., on-line, Internet, 3 March 2001, available from <http://www.nol.org/home/nmd/72csd/72web1.html>.

¹⁰ North Dakota ARNG Home Page, n.p., on-line, Internet, 3 March 2001, available from <http://www.guard.bismarck.nd.us/wpnsmd/index.htm>.

¹¹ Charles L. Cragin.

Chapter 3

The Problems

“After three years and \$143 million, the Army National Guard has no anti-terrorism teams ready to respond to nuclear, chemical or biological attacks because of defective safety equipment and poor training, an internal Pentagon review found.”

—Washington Post, Page 4, Feb 26, 2001

The WMD-CST program is necessary to bridge the local, state and federal gap in response to an expected WMD event. Charles L. Cragin, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, stated in April of 2000:

“The first 10 teams have completed their individual and unit collective training and are in the process of receiving highly sophisticated equipment. Each team has two large pieces of equipment: a mobile analytical laboratory for field analysis of chemical or biological agents and a unified command suite that has the ability to provide communications interoperability among the various responders who may be on scene. The first 10 teams will be certified as fully mission-capable later this spring, with the remaining 17 expected to come on line in early 2001.”¹

Mr. Cragin, while inadvertently highlighting a prime problem with conducting training before equipment receipt, was not accurate regarding the timeline for the teams. The teams were not certified by the spring of 2000 and in fact, still are not certified to this day. In addition, the teams are costing far more than originally estimated. “Cost estimates have risen from \$10.9 million to equip a single team versus the original estimate of a total of \$18.2 million to equip as many as 54 teams.”² Most of these problems are attributed to poor program management, the ill-defined organizational structure for Homeland Security (HLS) and “because officials tried to get

the teams ready very quickly.”³ The next few sections will provide more detailed information on these problems.

Program Management

The CoMPIO does not contain any acquisition certified personnel nor did they utilize the Army Acquisition Executive or capitalize on Army Materiel Command (AMC) expertise. This lack of acquisition experienced program management personnel directly led to failure to follow general accepted procedures in developing structured requirements, procurement, engineering, sustainment, reliability, maintainability, logistics and financial processes. The following sections document a major driver in this problem, the lack of formalized doctrine, and some of the major program management issues.

Doctrine

Doctrine is the “fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives.”⁴ For the WMD-CST program, doctrine should have been developed to address the unit’s mission, command relationships (federal and state), employment concepts, principles of operations and expected capabilities. Doctrine should help formulate the unit’s training, personnel composition and acquisition program. In addition, doctrine should determine the WMD-CSTs relationship to both federal and state response assets. Unfortunately, CoMPIO to this day has not formalized doctrine for the WMD-CST program.

It appears CoMPIO did not have any members experienced in writing doctrine. It is also apparent they did not attempt to develop doctrine based on any accepted model such as the Army’s Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Organization, Materiel Process or the Doctrinal Development Model (fig. 5). This problem was compounded by their lack of

coordination with other agencies with expertise in developing doctrine that could have provided assistance.




Figure 5 Doctrine Development Processes

The CoMPIO failed to coordinate doctrine either horizontally or vertically. They failed to consult with the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), which is the Army’s resident experts on development and implementation of doctrine and provides expert assistance to Army units. They also failed to coordinate their draft doctrine with the JTF-CS or request their doctrine to ensure congruence even though JTF-CS was assigned as the WMD-CSTs command element when in Title 10 status. Finally, CoMPIO failed to consult other response partners such as the FBI or FEMA to ensure synergy across the various agencies’ doctrine.

This inattention to doctrine led to both external and internal problems for the teams. For example, part of the team’s basic mission was assessing if a chemical or biological event had occurred. However, this task could lead to violations of DOD and DOJ policies that state “U.S. [sic] military personnel, including active duty, Reserve Components and/or National Guard

personnel will not collect evidence . . . unless specifically authorized by law enforcement and/or requested by the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] as the lead agency for crisis management.”⁵ Internally, matters as seemingly simple as the placement of teams was constantly changing due to the lack of formalized doctrine and the inability to adhere to draft doctrine. For example:

Plans originally called for the teams to be stationed near Air National Guard bases so they could be flown to the site of a terrorist attack. A second draft of those plans, however, called for team members to drive their personal cars to attack scenes, which could be hundreds of miles away. The guidelines have not been completed.⁶

These examples, and many others, point out how the absence of finalized doctrine has “encouraged and promoted an environment of persistent change to operational concepts and mission requirements” and an inability to create a structured equipment acquisition program, command structure or training program.⁷

Training

This lack of formalized doctrine created a training program that was not sufficiently developed, approved or implemented.⁸ The lack of a rigorous and formal training program is exemplified by the exercise evaluations (EXEVALS) conducted for the teams that were not targeted toward certification, did not follow specific doctrine (since there was NO formal doctrine) and were missing key personnel and equipment. For example, only five of the 10 teams evaluated had all 22 personnel, all 10 teams were missing their Mobile Analytical Laboratory System (MALS) van and personnel protective gear, nine out of 10 were missing their Unified Command Suite (UCS) and eight out of 10 were missing their detection equipment.⁹ This leads to the obvious question, how could the WMD-CSTs be evaluated when they were missing key personnel and the equipment critical to their assess and facilitate missions? This

problem is compounded by the fact that CoMPIO has not identified or funded any future EXEVAL cycles. Two final problems endemic to the small ARNG composition of the teams and their effect on training are (1) 16-week nuclear, biological and chemical training course was compressed into three weeks to facilitate ARNG training period resulting in the US Army Chemical School not awarding specialized military operational specialty (MOS) certification and (2) compressed time frame and stove-piped MOSs prevented cross-training that is vital to these “one-deep” teams. Most of these problems would have disappeared if CoMPIO had consulted the Army’s experts at TRADOC who could have helped procure training aids/equipment and assisted in structuring a program aimed toward certification and continuing mission excellence.

Certification

There is disagreement on the required Army readiness certification. CoMPIO has stated they believe the teams only require a C3 readiness level to request certification while the DOD IG report states they need a C1 readiness level. The FY1999 National Defense Authorization Act specifically states “a reserve component rapid assessment element team [WMD-CST], and any Reserve assigned to such a team, may not be used to respond to an emergency . . . unless . . . the team, or that Reserve, possesses the requisite skills, training and equipment to be proficient in **all** mission requirements.” The key word in this statement is “all.” The definitions for readiness levels in Army Regulation 220, dated 1 September 1997, clearly drives the team to a certification requirement of readiness level C1. In addition, the small unit size and criticality to the nation’s defense of these teams should also drive a C1 readiness level. However, despite this obvious requirement and need, nine of 10 teams have requested certification even though they only hold a C3 readiness level. Of these nine, none have been approved, with two currently awaiting Secretary of the Army approval and seven awaiting Secretary of Defense approval.

Equipment

“CoMPIO, despite lacking acquisition certified personnel familiar with chemical and biological defense systems, retained acquisition decision authority.”¹⁰ This lack of acquisition discipline created a culture that circumvented normal DOD acquisition channels in developing the table of distribution and allowance (TDA) and acquiring equipment which resulted in increased cost and risk, poor equipment inter-operability and a lack of consistency of equipment across the teams. This is another example where CoMPIO failed to consult available experts, in this case the Army’s Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, the Army’s Force Development Branch, or the Defense Logistics Agency.¹¹

These equipment problems created safety hazards and put the WMD-CST mission at risk. For example, the WMD-CSTs were issued the M48 blower to use with the M40 mask even though they were not originally designed to function together. One WMD-CST commander said of the mask and blower “it probably would work, I am just not willing to bet my life on it.”¹² In addition, several inspections noted the air filters were installed backwards on the MALS van and would require personnel to enter a potentially warm or hot zone to attempt to change the five metal-encased filters, each weighing about 30 pounds and place them into a thin plastic bag without puncturing the bag! Also, “the MALS vans issued to the WMD-CSTs lacked the florescent microscope, the polymerase chain reaction technology [DNA fingerprinting], and the enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA),” which are essential to the “assess” portion of the WMD-CST mission.¹³ The florescent microscope was not available because it required eight electrical outlets and the MALS van only provided five. The Army’s solution was to erect a tent outside the van and run an extension cord out to the microscope.¹⁴ This would potentially put additional personnel into a hot zone and require disassembly and re-assembly of the tent every

time the wind direction changes. This lack of inter-operability between the MALS and the microscope was symbolic of the poor systems engineering practices applied by CoMPIO.

This lack of adherence to basic systems engineering precepts also caused problems with the teams two primary pieces of equipment, the MALS and the UCS. The MALS and UCS were not acquired as an integrated project and are not readily interoperable since the MALS is Windows 98 based and the UCS is Windows NT based. This lack of interoperability is a prime example of the poor systems engineering and program management CoMPIO applied to this project and directly impacts the team's ability to provide reachback capabilities to support the mission of assess, advise and facilitate.

Organizational Interfaces

Command Relationships

The unique federal-state relationship of the WMD-CSTs is one of its greatest strengths, but can also create one of its greatest weaknesses. This dual status possibility can provide great flexibility but can also produce a dual chain of command, a dichotomy in missions, and indecision in when to transfer status. It is likely the WMD-CSTs will first respond to an event in Title 32 status by order of the governor. This will have the advantage of allowing them to be quickly on-scene without a request from the governor to the president and will not subject them to the Posse Comitatus Act thus allowing more freedom to perform any law enforcement missions. However, according to Admiral Gehman, commander of Joint Forces Command "in the case where you do not federalize the National Guard, you have the problem of having two military chains of command, one reporting to the governor, and one reporting to the Department of Defense. Obviously, that's a problem, and we don't like that...but the larger issue concerns

who is in charge of what forces." ¹⁵ This dual chain of command can lead to inefficiency in the WMD response and reduce the WMD-CSTs reachback capability degrading their facilitate mission by "disconnecting" them from the federal command and control network.

However, if the teams are federalized it may also create problems in response time, mission and command and control. The request from the governor to the president and the subsequent coordination through the WMD Preparedness Group chaired by the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support (ATSD-CS) may take critical time to accomplish. Also, once the team is federalized, it will then fall under operational command and control of the JTF-CS giving it access to military forces, subject matter experts, labs and medical support. However, this federal access may come at the expense of access to local and state responders since they operate under different control networks and response doctrine.¹⁶ Furthermore, this could complicate the response since the JTF-CS mission only allows it to respond to terrorist incidents while the WMD-CSTs can respond to either naturally occurring or terrorist WMD incidents. Therefore, regardless of which status the WMD-CSTs operate under, there is likely to be mission and command and control problems.

External Interfaces

The WMD-CSTs will face an unbelievable array of external interfaces and coordinating mechanisms. The WMD-CST (when federalized) and other federal response units will fall under the umbrella of HLS. Unfortunately, there are currently "thirty-six federal agencies in charge of Homeland Security," some of which are depicted in figure 6.¹⁷ This does not even account for the myriad of possible DOD response teams that may be on-scene (fig. 7). In addition, the lead federal agency will transition from the FBI to FEMA at some unspecified time during the event. Also, "there are over 600 local and state hazardous materials teams in the U.S. [sic] that assess

and take appropriate actions in incidents almost daily involving highly toxic industrial chemicals and other hazardous materials.”¹⁸ All of this indicates there is a high probability of an incredible amount of command and control confusion at the scene of an event that is likely to overwhelm the “facilitating” capability of a 22-person WMD-CST. These organizational problems, when combined with the doctrine, equipment and training issues mentioned earlier, are likely to result in a degradation or a complete inability of the WMD-CSTs to perform their critical mission of assess, advise and facilitate.




Figure 6 Homeland Security Response Organization

- US Army:
 - Chemical Biological Rapid Response Team (C/B-RRT)
 - Technical Escort Unit (TEU)
 - Elements of the 52nd Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Teams
 - Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID)
 - Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense (USAMRICD)
 - Chemical-Biological Assessment Team
 - Chemical Recon and Decon Platoons
 - Biological Integrated Detection System (BIDS) Companies
 - Chemical School at Maneuver Support Center (MANSCEN)
 - Theater Army Mobile Laboratories (TAML)
 - The Soldier Biological and Chemical Command (SBCCOM)
- Nuclear Execution Augmentation Team (NEAT)
- Naval Medical Research Center (NMRC)
- Elements of the Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division (NAVEODTECHDIV)
- Nuclear-Radiological Assessment Team (NRAT)
- USMC Chemical, Biological, Incident Response Force (CBIRF)

Figure 7 Possible DOD WMD Response Teams

Notes

¹ Charles L. Cragin, “Defense Leaders Commentary: The Facts on WMD Civil Support Teams,” 6 April 2000, n.p., on-line, Internet, 3 March 2001, available from http://www.infowar.com/wmd/00/wmd_040600a_j.shtml.

² Tony Capaccio, “Pentagon Mismanaged Chemical and Bio Defense Team, Audit Says,” *Bloomberg Magazine*, 4 February 2001, n.p., on-line, Internet, 4 February 2001, available from <http://Bloomberg.com>.

³ “National Guard Anti-Terrorism Teams At Risk,” *Washington Post*, 26 February 2001, 4.

⁴ *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, *Joint Pub 0-2* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 24 February 1995), GL-5.

⁵ Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, “Audit Report: Management of National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams,” D-2001-043 (Washington, D.C.: DOD Inspector General, 31 January 2001), 6.

⁶ Matt Kelley, “National Guard Teams Found Unprepared,” *Washington Post*, 25 February 2001, 17.

⁷ Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, 5.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 8.

Notes

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid., 14.

¹² Ibid., 16.

¹³ Ibid., 23.

¹⁴ Ibid., 37.

¹⁵ Katherine McIntire Peters, "Defending U.S.," *Government Executive Magazine*, 1 June 2000, n.p., on-line, Internet, 3 March 2001, available from <http://www.govexec.com/features/0600/0600s2.htm>.

¹⁶ Charles L. Cragin.

¹⁷ Lt Gen Paul K. Carlton, Jr., USAF Surgeon General, lecture, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 6 February 2001.

¹⁸ General Accounting Office, "Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is Unclear," GAO/T-NSIAD-99-184, 23 June 1999, n.p., on-line, Internet, 12 February 2001, available from <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgiin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64.21&filename=ns99184t.txt&directory=/diskb/wais/data/gao>.

Chapter 4

Some Solutions

The enemy is anybody who's going to get you killed, no matter which side he's on.

—Joseph Heller, **Catch-22**

There is no doubt the WMD-CST mission is a critical enabler to the nation's response to a WMD event and therefore warrants exploration on ways to fix some of the aforementioned problems. The primary areas for improvement are doctrine, program management and command and control structure.

Doctrine

As previously mentioned, doctrine drives how a unit organizes, equips and trains. The current structure of this program envisions 54 teams, one in every state and territory, performing all facets of the assess, advise and facilitate mission. This is primarily to ensure a quick on-scene response most likely in Title 32 status. However, this structure has led to inconsistencies across the teams and complicates the inter-operability and training regimens. A better structure would create 10 teams, one in each FEMA region, modeled on the US Air Force's Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF) process (fig. 8). This would have the following benefits (1) reduce the number of teams which require full training, (2) allow consistent and structured down periods for training, (3) have two teams available for responses either individually or in tandem at all times and (4) provide a system with on-call back-ups to support these one-deep teams.




Figure 8 Proposed WMD-CST Concept

The remaining 44 envisioned teams would stand-up and train only to accomplish the advise and facilitate mission. This would greatly reduce their training regimen but would still allow them to fulfill the critical advise and facilitate mission between the state/local and federal response units until one or more of the on-call “WMD-CST full mission teams” arrived. This has the potential to double the number of “advise and facilitators” on-scene assisting state and local responders. This would also reduce the manpower requirements for these 44 teams from 22 personnel to 10. Placing the 10 full mission response teams at or near Air National Guard (ANG) or Air Force Reserve (AFR) air mobility bases would enable this new concept. These teams would constitute a high-priority cargo and would utilize ANG or AFR airlift aircraft to get quickly to the scene of an event anywhere in their region.

To further energize this concept, the creation of several organizational agreements should occur now to prepare for a future disaster. Agreements between the governors in each region allowing other states ARNG WMD-CSTs to operate in their state are essential to timely response. In addition, the governors and the president should explore templates for waiving the

Posse Comitatus Act similar to the waiver provided during the Atlanta prison riots to allow full flexibility to these critical response teams. Also, definitive doctrine concerning the federal command and control structure of the JTF-CS is required. In addition, creation of coordinating centers at the JTF-CS and state national guard bureaus to support the WMD-CSTs are vital. These coordinating centers would not require full-time personnel but would be activated during an event. The JTF-CS coordinating center would provide an essential pipeline for the WMD-CSTs to reachback to federal assets. These changes have the potential to energize the WMD-CSTs but will only prove effective if fundamental changes are made to the organizational structure for this program.

Organizational Structure

In January of 2001 in response to the DOD IG draft audit report, the Secretary of Defense ordered the dissolution of CoMPIO and integration of its functions into the OSD. Specifically, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs would provide specific policy guidance and oversight consistent with the broader policies of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civil Support who is responsible for coordinating and integrating the domestic consequence management program.¹ Subsequent to that decision on March 2, 2001, these responsibilities were transferred to the National Guard Bureau. A letter (appendix C) written by Gregory R. Dahlberg, Acting Secretary of the Army, stated the “National Guard Bureau is responsible for all management functions for this unique response capability to include training, organizing, acquisition, sustainment, operational support and force development. I delegate Component Acquisition Executive responsibilities to the Chief, NGB, for the Civil Support Teams.”² This letter further directs the NGB to “coordinate with major commands and agencies having responsibilities relating to the WMD-CSTs.”³ This direction is too narrow. This

delegation and transfer to the NGB will only succeed if they deviate from CoMPIO's isolationist practices and delegate, rather than just coordinate, responsibilities to the appropriate expert organizations.

The first step NGB should accomplish is to create an interagency working group (IAWG) to define performance, testing, training and sustainment requirements (figure 9). In the past, CoMPIO has defined the requirements for the program. This was the wrong approach in the past and for the future. The IAWG, consisting of permanent members from DOJ, FEMA and DOD, and capitalizing on available expert advisors such as TRADOC and the HQ Army Staff, should create three key requirements documents for NGB approval to provide direction for the WMD-CST program. These documents are (1) the Operational Requirements Document (ORD) with prime inputs from JTF-CS and representatives from the actual WMD-CST teams to describe technical performance and sustainment requirements, (2) the Joint Training Plan (JTP) with assistance from US Army Forces Command and TRADOC defining training requirements, and (3) an OT&E Test Plan with assistance from Dugway Proving Grounds defining the testing philosophy. All of these documents would address both the federal and state missions driving the acquisition strategy for the program.

However, changes to the requirements process are pointless without concomitant changes in the acquisition and sustainment processes of these teams. Dissolution of the CoMPIO concept and replacing it with a radically different approach at this late date is akin to throwing out the baby with the bath water. Restructuring the CoMPIO concept to capitalize on the expert structures already in place in the Army is more efficient than discarding the concept. Movement of CoMPIO into Army Materiel Command (AMC) should occur since they are the "Army's premier provider of materiel readiness - technology, acquisition, materiel development, logistics

power projection and sustainment - to the total force across the spectrum of joint military operations.”⁴ Specifically, US Army Soldier Biological and Chemical Command (SBCCOM), a major organization within AMC whose mission is to “develop, integrate, acquire, and sustain soldier and NBC defense technology, systems, and services,” seems like the appropriate place for the acquisition office to reside.⁵ The NGB should also delegate the Component Acquisition Executive (CAE) authority, which provides acquisition direction, to either an AMC Program Executive Officer (PEO) or directly to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology) since the NGB’s primary acquisition experience is in commodity purchases rather than research and development programs. This would place the acquisition and sustainment portions of the WMD-CST program in expert and experienced hands. This change in the oversight and guidance of the new and improved CoMPIO, hereafter referred to as the WMD-CST System Program Office (WSPO), would enable them to manage the program more effectively.




Figure 9 Recommended Organizational Relationships

Program Management

Program management areas of improvement are focused in three areas: doctrine, equipment and testing. The WSPO should ensure JTF-CS and the National Guard Bureau work with TRADOC to develop doctrine for the employment of these teams. This doctrine combined with the ORD would provide direction to the acquisition program.

The equipment acquisition program needs rejuvenation. Charles Cragin said “all safety problems identified by the inspector general will be fixed before he recommends that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld certify the teams ready for duty. Cragin said he did not know when that would be.”⁶ Therefore, we need to formalize the equipment acquisition process by creating aggressive yet achievable schedules and solving the technical and safety problems in order to gain certification. The primary step WSPO should take to improve the acquisition program is to hire a prime contractor to execute the program. The government is ill-equipped and historically very poor at equipment integration as proven by the CoMPIO management of the equipment for the WMD-CST program. The WSPO should incentivize the prime contractor making them responsible for procuring and integrating the equipment for both types of WMD-CSTs.

The prime contractor would also bear responsibility for developing training and testing programs consistent with the ORD and JTP, and targeted toward certification. The WSPO, in consultation with TRADOC, would review the training program for consistency and completeness and approve it only when the requirements of the JTP are met. The creation of a testing program geared toward the contractual requirements specification and focussed on the ORD is also essential. For long-term training and testing improvement, WSPO should create, in conjunction with organizations like Dugway Proving Grounds, whose mission is to “test U.S.

and Allied [sic] biological & chemical defense systems,” an annual Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI) process.⁷ This process would tie directly to the training periods in figure 8. These modifications to the short and long-term doctrine, acquisition, testing and training programs, coupled with the organizational changes mentioned earlier, will ensure continued viability of these critical teams.

Notes

¹ Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, “Audit Report: Management of National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams,” D-2001-043 (Washington, D.C.: DOD Inspector General, 31 January 2001), ii.

² Gregory R. Dahlberg, Acting Secretary of the Army, letter, subject: Proponency of the National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction – Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST) – ACTION MEMORANDUM, 2 March 2001.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Army Materiel Command Web Site, n.p., on-line, Internet, 6 March 2001, available from http://www.amc.army.mil/about_amc/about_amc.htm.

⁵ SBCCOM Web Site, n.p., on-line, Internet, 13 April 2001, available from, <http://www.sbccom.army.mil/about/mission.htm>.

⁶ Matt Kelley, “Nat'l Guard Teams Found Unprepared,” *Washington Post*, Feb 25, 2001.

⁷ Dugway Proving Grounds Web Site, n.p., on-line, Internet, 10 April 2001, available from <http://www.deq.state.ut.us/eqshw/cds/DWayHP1.htm>.

Chapter 5

Future Study Areas

Basic research is what I am doing when I don't know what I am doing.

—Wernher von Braun

This research paper has only scratched the surface of this incredibly complex and evolving topic. Further research should explore numerous other areas to assist the nation in developing HLS and assessing its impact on the WMD-CST program. On the national level, the effect of the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century Report that overhauls our nation's security infrastructure on the strategic direction of the WMD-CST program is a prime topic for research. On the operational level, the on-going evolution of the JTF-CS and its effect on the federal command and control of the WMD-CSTs would provide an excellent research area. Also, the integration of the WMD-CST's training, equipment and doctrine with the DOD teams responsible for this mission outside of the US is another needed operational level topic. In addition, the conduct of research to determine how DOD's critical enablers of logistics, space, communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance can influence and shape the WMD-CST mission is a crucial area. Finally, a thorough analysis of the economic aspects of the creation and sustainment of the WMD-CST program to ensure the same mistakes are not repeated is a critical unexplored topic. These areas, and many more, are ripe for research and would greatly benefit our nation as we confront the ever-growing threat of the combination of terrorism and WMD.

Chapter 6

Parting Thoughts

The future belongs to those who prepare for it today.

—Malcolm X

The threat of WMD is a reality and is likely to strike the US in the near future. To have any hope of surviving this event the US must rely on all available response units, local, state and federal. Local and state response units will arrive on-scene quickly and have an invaluable familiarity with the environment and culture at “ground zero.” However, they are likely to get overwhelmed quickly. This is where the federal government can assist with its experience in WMD events, defense and response. To ensure a synergistic response occurs, a closing of the chasm between local/state and federal doctrine and strategy is critical.

The ARNG is the logical and correct choice to provide this bridge via the WMD-CSTs. However, this solution, in its current form, generates 54 state/territorial and 36 federal fiefdoms which need strong control mechanisms in place to assure congruence. The current lack of a strong controlling influence has resulted in the problems listed in chapter three. The solutions contained in chapter four and generated by the future studies in chapter five could correct this problem and turn these necessary WMD-CST teams from failure to success. This must happen since the alternative will only spell disaster for our country in the future.

Appendix A

WMD-CST Team Composition

Position	Rank	MOS	MOS Description
Commander	LTC (O-5)	01A	Officer Generalist
Deputy Commander	MAJ (O-4)	01A	Officer Generalist
Assistant Operations Officer	CPT (O-3)	O-1A	Officer Generalist
Senior Operations NCO	MSG (E-8)	54B	Chemical Operations Specialist
Operations NCO	SFC (E-7)	71L	Admin Specialist
Assistant Operations NCO	SSG (E-6)	71L	Admin Specialist
Logistics NCO	SFC (E-7)	92Y	Unity Supply Specialist
Administrative NCO	SGT (E-5)	75B	Personnel Admin Specialist
Communications Team Chief	SFC (E-7)	31U	Signal Support System Specialist
Information Systems Operator	SFC (E-7)	74B	Chemical Branch Officer
Physicians Assistant	MAJ (O-4)	62B	Field Surgeon
Medical Operations Officer	CPT (O-3)	70H	Health Services Plans and Operations
Nuclear Medical Science Officer	CPT (O-3)	72A	Nuclear Medical Science Officer
Medical NCO	SFC (E-7)	91B	Medical Specialist
Survey Team Leader	CPT (O-3)	74B	Chemical Branch Officer
NBC Reconnaissance NCO	SFC (E-7)	54B	Chemical Operations Specialist
2-NBC Team Chiefs	SSG (E-6)	54B	Chemical Operations Specialist
4-NBC NCOs	SGT (E-5)	54B	Chemical Operations Specialists

MOS - military occupational specialty

NCO - non-commissioned officer

NBC - nuclear, biological, and chemical

Appendix B

WMD-CST State Distribution

State	Year Authorized		State	Year Authorized
Colorado	1998		Alaska	1999
Georgia	1998		Arizona	1999
Illinois	1998		Arkansas	1999
California	1998		California (2nd team)	1999
Massachusetts	1998		Florida	1999
Missouri	1998		Hawaii	1999
New York	1998		Idaho	1999
Pennsylvania	1998		Iowa	1999
Texas	1998		Kentucky	1999
Washington	1998		Louisiana	1999
			Maine	1999
			Minnesota	1999
			New Mexico	1999
			Ohio	1999
			Oklahoma	1999
			South Carolina	1999
			Virginia	1999

Note: Five additional teams authorized in FY2000 but not yet assigned to a state.

WMD-CST Proponency Letter, 2 March 2001



Gregory R. Dahlberg
Acting Secretary of the Army

Glossary

- C1 Readiness Level.** The unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake the full wartime mission(s) for which it is organized or designed. [Army Regulation 220]
- C3 Readiness Level.** The unit possess the required resources and is trained to undertake many portions of the wartime mission...The unit would require significant compensation for deficiencies. [Army Regulation 220]
- CBRNE.** Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives. This term describes the delivery mechanisms that when combined with the effect creates the term weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
- Civil Affairs.** The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations, between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and non-governmental, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives. Civil affairs may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. [HLS Army Strategic Plan]
- Consequence Management.** Actions that comprise those essential services required for managing and mitigating problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes including natural, manmade or terrorist incidents. Such services may include transportation, communications, public works and engineering, fire-fighting, information planning, mass care resources, health and medical services, urban search and rescue, hazardous materials, food and energy. [JP 3-07.7 Draft]
- Consequence Management Program Integration Office.** The Army office whose responsibilities include budgeting, contracting, and quality assurance actions; evaluating current capabilities of WMD response elements; integrating WMD training activities; coordinating development of WMD consequence management doctrine and modifications; coordinating development and production of doctrinal publications; and coordinating development of scenarios and integrating WMD exercise activities among local, state, and Federal response elements.
- Crisis Management.** Measures to identify, acquire and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate prevent and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism. [Pending revision to JP 3-07.7 Draft]
- Deterrence.** The prevention from action due to fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction. [HLS Army Strategic Plan]
- Domestic Preparedness Program.** The program initiated by the Department of Defense in response to Public Law 104-201 to provide equipment, training and other necessary assistance for first responders to WMD incidents.

Exercise Evaluations (EXEVALS). Training events designed to show commanders the strengths and weaknesses of their units for determining future training requirements. [DOD IG Audit Report]

Federal Response Plan. The Federal Response Plan (FRP) establishes a process and structure for the systematic, coordinated, and effective delivery of Federal assistance to address the consequences of any major disaster or emergency declared under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended. The FRP describes the major components of the Federal disaster operations system, as well as the structure for coordinating Federal response and recovery actions necessary to address state-identified requirements and priorities. [HLS Army Strategic Plan]

HAPSITE. The HAPSITE is a self-contained, field-portable gas chromatograph/mass spectrometer used to provide fast on-site analysis of volatile organic compounds. The headspace sampling system enhances the gas chromatograph/mass spectrometer by expanding the analysis of volatile organic compounds in soil or water. [DOD IG Audit Report]

Homeland Security (HLS). Protecting our territory, population, and infrastructure at home by deterring, defending against, and mitigating the effects of all threats to US sovereignty; supporting civil authorities in crisis and consequence management; and helping to ensure the availability, integrity, survivability, and adequacy of critical national assets. [HLS Army Strategic Plan]

Joint Task Force – Civil Support (JTF-CS). Joint Task Force – Civil Support is the headquarters within U.S. Joint Forces Command that will provide command and control for Department of Defense (DOD) forces that may respond to requests for assistance from the Lead Federal Agency following a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) incident in the continental United States. [JTF-CS Web Site]

Mobility Analytical Laboratory Van (MALS). The MALS van contains the major items of equipment necessary for a thorough on-site assessment and identification of a potential agent. [DOD IG Report]

Mission Essential Task List (METL). A compilation of collective mission essential tasks that must be successfully performed if an organization is to accomplish its mission.

Military Assistance to Civilian Authorities (MACA). When directed, military assistance to local, state or federal agencies to alleviate the effects of disasters or other domestic emergencies. MSCA is a subset of MACA. [HLS Army Strategic Plan]

Military Support to Civilian Authorities (MSCA). Those activities and measures taken by the Department of Defense to foster mutual assistance and support between the Department of Defense and any civil government agency in planning or preparing for, or in the application of resources in response to the consequences of civil emergencies or attacks including national security emergencies. [HLS Army Strategic Plan]

Operational Requirements Document. The ORD establishes the operational framework and performance baseline for an acquisition program. It contains key performance parameters and measures of performance that shape the requirements a program must attain.

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The Department of Defense review required by law that occurs every four years focussed on threats, strategy, implementation, and finally resources. It culminates with a bottoms-up review of DOD's force structure and recommendations for any changes to support the proposed strategy.

Posse Comitatus Act. The law that prohibits military members serving under Title 10 from performing law enforcement duties except under exceptional situations, i.e. governor and presidential agreement.

Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID). Former name of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams. The name was changed due to the negative public connotation of the acronym RAID and to suggest the teams were created to conduct support of civilian operations vice a military operation.

Table of Distribution and Allowance (TDA). TDA units are non-deployable units organized to fulfill missions, functions, and workload obligations of a fixed support establishment in the continental United States or overseas. TDA units are uniquely developed to perform a specific support mission. They usually include civilian manpower, whereas a modified table of organization and equipment unit generally will not.

Title 10. The section of the US Code governing roles and mission of the Active Duty and Reserve Components of the US Military. It also governs the National Guard when in federal status.

Title 32. The section of the US code governing roles and missions of the National Guard when in their state militia status.

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). The Army command that contains experts in developing doctrine and developing and conducting training.

Unified Command Plan (UCP). The Unified Command Plan allocates responsibilities among the nine combatant commands. It establishes the commands' missions, responsibilities and force structure. The plan also defines the geographical commands' areas of responsibilities.

Unified Command Suite (UCS). A communications suite mounted on a commercial truck chassis intended to provide an architecture that will ensure communications and data connectivity among the local, state and federal response forces. [DOD IG Audit Report]

Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD). Any weapon or device that is intended or has the capability to cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant number of people through the release, dissemination or impact of: toxic or poisonous chemicals or other precursors, a disease organism; or nuclear or radiological material, toxins or other explosive device. [JP 3-07.7 Draft]

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